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NOTES
DEATH IS STILL CERTAIN, BUT ARE
TAXES?: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON
RETROACTIVE TAX LEGISLATION
AFTER CARLTON v. UNITED STATES
Although retroactive civil statutes are not expressly prohibited
by the Constitution,1 the validity of such statutes has frequently
' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed."); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any... ex post facto Law."). In 1798, the
Supreme Court first noted that the ex post facto clauses only prohibit retroactive laws of a
criminal nature. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 397 (1798); RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
§ 15.9, at 470-71 (2d ed. 1992). Although the reach of the ex post facto clauses has not
always been certain, the Supreme Court has confined their application to criminal statutes.
See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952) (distinguishing earlier cases in-
terpreting ex post facto clauses broadly); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242
(1912). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10-2 to -3 (2d
ed. 1988) (tracing history of ex post facto clauses from constitutional origins to modem
judicial interpretation).
Judicial hostility towards retroactive laws can be traced to early Greek and Roman law.
See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Juris-
prudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 775 (1936). This bias against retroactivity was adopted by
the English common-law courts, and later by American courts, as a maxim of statutory con-
struction. Id. at 780. "Perhaps the most fundamental reason why retroactive legislation is
suspect stems from the principle that a person should be able to plan his conduct with
reasonable certainty of the legal consequences." Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court
and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960). In
addition, courts have traditionally opposed retroactive laws because they create instability
and can be used either to benefit or to harm selected classes of citizens. See id. at 692-93;
ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra, § 15.9, at 470-71. Notwithstanding this long tradition of judicial
aversion for retroactive legislation, laws having retrospective effect are regularly enacted,
and upheld by the courts. See, e.g., infra note 10 (demonstrating judicial acceptance of vari-
ous retroactive taxing statutes); see also W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REv. 216, 221-25 (1960) (analyzing
policies behind due process limitations on retroactive laws); Bryant Smith, Retroactive
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been assessed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.2 Operating within this broad framework, courts have devel-
oped seemingly nebulous standards.' In particular, the standard
governing retroactively applied tax laws simply looks to whether
the tax is "harsh and oppressive."'4 Not surprisingly, retroactive
Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tsx. L. REv. 229 (1927) (examining grounds for distinction be-
tween valid and invalid retroactive legislation).
I See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." Id. Commentators have suggested that the framers of the Constitution did not intend
the Due Process Clause to apply to retroactive civil legislation. See ROTUNDA & NowAK,
supra note 1, § 15.9, at 457. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Pro-
cess Clause as a limitation on four major areas of retroactive civil legislation: (1) emergency
retroactive legislation; (2) curative statutes; (3) retroactive taxing statutes; and (4) retroac-
tive general legislation. See id. (identifying leading cases and standards applicable to each
group of retroactive legislation).
The Supreme Court has interpreted other provisions of the Constitution as imposing
restrictions, or even prohibitions, on retroactive civil laws. See Hochman, supra note 1, at
694. In particular, the Supreme Court has relied on the Contract Clause, id., which provides
that "[n]o State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Contract Clause was included in the Constitution in order to
prohibit the states' enactment of debtor relief laws. See ROTUNDA & NowAKc, supra note 1,
§ 15.8, at 437-38. However, the Marshall Court gave the clause an expansive reading and
used it to protect property owners from state regulation. Id. at 438-39. The Contract Clause
had, until the last fifteen years, remained dormant as a means of voiding retroactive legisla-
tion. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244-51 (1978) (holding that
retroactive statute affecting pension plan obligations violated Contract Clause); United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14-32 (1977) (finding that Contract Clause pro-
hibited retroactive repeal of statute limiting transportation subsidies); TRIE, supra note 1,
§§ 9-11. But see Hochman, supra note 1, at 694 n.15 (noting occasional use of Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause to invalidate retroactive legislation). See generally Richard A. Ep-
stein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CH. L. REv. 703 (1984) (em-
phasizing importance of Contract Clause as limitation on legislative power).
3 See Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights II, 6 TEx. L. REv. 409, 409
(1928). Courts have historically contributed to the uncertainty in the retroactive law area by
using nebulous language, such as "against natural right" and "a violation of fundamental
principles." Id. One scholar has noted that this evasive language constitutes "but blinds to
cover up the mental indisposition or inability to see the problem through," which are "ex-
pressions of vague feeling that the law is very bad without being able to say just why." Id.
4 United States v. Hernme, 476 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1986) (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305
U.S. 134, 147 (1938)). With slight variation, virtually all circuit courts of appeals have
adopted the "harsh and oppressive" standard. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d
311, 314 (5th Cir. 1990); Temple Univ. v. United States, 769 F.2d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); Ward v. United States, 695 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir.
1982). See generally BORIS I. BrrrKR & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND Girs 1.2.6, at 1-30 to -31 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing due process limitations on
retroactive taxation). When analyzing the constitutionality of retroactive civil legislation
outside the tax field, the Supreme Court determines whether the statute is "arbitrary and
irrational." See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). The "arbitrary
and irrational" standard articulated in Turner Elkhorn does not differ from the "harsh and
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tax legislation has been the subject of considerable litigation and
debate.5
Courts have interpreted the harsh and oppressive standard
flexibly,6 relying on a variety of factors.7 Although courts have not
oppressive" standard applicable to tax legislation. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984).
1 See, e.g., Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568-69 (retroactive change to gift tax provision); United
States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 301 (1981) (per curiam) (retroactive amendments to min-
imum tax provisions); Welch, 305 U.S. at 146-51 (retroactive state tax provision); Unter-
myer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928) (retroactive gift tax); Brushaber v. Union
Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 8 (1916) (retroactive income tax); see also James S. Bryant, Retroac-
tive Taxation: A Constitutional Analysis of the Minimum Tax on IDCs, 36 OKLA. L. REV.
107, 114-17 (1983) (arguing that retroactive minimum tax should be unconstitutional); Note,
Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARv. L. REV. 436,
436-37 n.8 (1970) [hereinafter Rule of Prospectivity] (noting issues raised by retroactive
taxation). But see Frederick A. Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REV.
592, 592 (1935) (" 'Arbitrary retroactivity' may continue hopefully to rear its head in tax
briefs, but for practical purposes, in this field, it is as dead as wager of law."); Slawson,
supra note 1, at 232 n.85 (observing that Supreme Court's interpretation of estate tax im-
plies retroactive rate change may be made without notice).
I See, e.g., Hemme, 476 U.S. at 567-69; Purvis v. United States, 501 F.2d 311, 313 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 420 F.2d
725, 730 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); see also JACOB MRTENS, JR., LAW OF
FEDERAL INcohm TAX § 4.15, at 32-33 (1991) (listing factors used to interpret "harsh and
oppressive" standard).
7 See, e.g., Temple Univ., 769 F.2d at 135 (asserting that length of retroactive period
can be controlling factor). In Welch, the Supreme Court recognized Congress's ability to
retroactively tax income derived in the year of statutory enactment, and in some instances,
even income derived in the preceding year. 305 U.S. at 148-49; see also Darusmont, 449 U.S.
at 297 (reaffirming Welch's statement on length of retroactive period). The Supreme Court's
ambiguity in Welch, with respect to taxation of pre-enactment years, has led some state
courts to hold that revenue statutes applied to the year immediately preceding enactment
are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Budd Co., 108 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1954), appeal
dismissed, 349 U.S. 935 (1955); Gulf & Western Corp. v. Commonwealth, 459 A.2d 1369 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983). The Federal Circuit has not "adopted an absolute temporal limitation
on retroactivity." See Temple Univ., 769 F.2d at 135. Curative legislation, enacted to reflect
the intent of Congress, has been permitted to reach as far back as four years. See New
England Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 807 F.2d 280, 284-85 (1st Cir. 1986). But see
Wheeler v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 162, 166 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding tax statute with two
year retroactive effect unconstitutional), rev'd on other grounds, 324 U.S. 542 (1945).
Additionally, courts have considered the type and nature of the tax, scrutinizing
"wholly new" taxes more strictly. See, e.g., Estate of Ekins v. Commissioner, 797 F.2d 481,
484-85 (7th Cir. 1986); Fein v. United States, 730 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 858 (1984); Estate of Ceppi v. Commissioner, 698 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983); Westwick v. Commissioner, 636 F.2d 291, 292 (10th Cir. 1980);
see also infra notes 19-33 and accompanying text (discussing estate and gift tax cases).
Traditionally, retroactive income tax legislation has been accorded greater legislative
deference than retroactive estate and gift tax legislation. See Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 296-98
(observing that virtually all past income tax acts that were applied retroactively did not
violate Fifth Amendment due process); Welch, 305 U.S. at 149 (noting that retroactive ap-
plication of income tax laws has been unequivocally held constitutional); Cohan v. Commis-
1993]
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adopted a uniform analysis,8 one factor many courts consider is the
foreseeability of the tax change.9 Despite the sometimes inconsis-
tent legal doctrine, the results have been consistent: most forms of
retroactive taxation have been upheld. 0 Nevertheless, in Carlton
sioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930); (concluding that Congress has great freedom to ret-
roactively enact income tax legislation); see also Ballard, supra note 5, at 597-601
(describing overwhelming trend by courts to affirm retroactive income tax legislation); Law-
rence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition Rules & Other Ad Hoc Legislation Constitu-
tional?, 44 TAX L. REv. 563, 608 (1989) (noting that Supreme Court has never sustained due
process challenge to retroactive income tax provision). By contrast, the Supreme Court has
been more willing to strike down the retroactive application of estate or gift taxes on due
process grounds. See, e.g., Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 440; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142
(1927), modified on other grounds, 276 U.S. 594 (1928); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531
(1927); cf. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931) (holding retroactive state tax violative of
Fourteenth Amendment due process).
Finally, some courts have identified whether the taxpayer had a vested right under the
pre-amended tax law. See, e.g., Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 25-26 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); New England Baptist Hosp., 807 F.2d at 285.
1 See supra note 7 (citing cases implementing different analyses of retroactive
taxation).
' See Hemme, 476 U.S. at 569 (discussing relevance of notice to due process analysis of
retroactive taxation); Welch, 305 U.S. at 147 (distinguishing cases in which taxpayer could
not reasonably anticipate change in tax statute); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 21
(1931) (holding gift tax constitutional because taxpayer could reasonably foresee change);
Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445-46 (holding gift tax legislation unconstitutional since taxpayer
could not reasonably foresee tax change); Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147 (same); Nichols, 274
U.S. at 542 (holding retroactive estate tax unconstitutional due to taxpayer's lack of notice);
Canisius College, 799 F.2d at 26 (finding retroactive employment tax foreseeable); see also
Bryant, supra note 5, at 108-11 (discussing foreseeability rule). But cf. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1983) (questioning relevance of notice
in analyzing due process concerns regarding retroactive change to pension plan regulation).
Additionally, if the court finds that the taxpayer was unable to foresee the tax law
change, then it must consider whether the taxpayer relied on the pre-amended tax statute.
See Hochman, supra note 1, at 706-07; see also Hemme, 476 U.S. at 571 (holding retroactive
estate tax constitutional because taxpayer had "no expectation" of existing tax laws);
Welch, 305 U.S. at 147 (finding retroactive income tax inoffensive based on taxpayer's fail-
ure to voluntarily invoke tax laws); Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147 (implying that taxpayer relied
on tax laws as applicable before retroactive change in taxation); Canisius College, 799 F.2d
at 26 (considering relevance of taxpayer reliance). See generally MERTENS, supra note 6, at
32-33 (noting requirement of reliance in conjunction with foreseeability).
"0 See, e.g., Hemme, 476 U.S. at 572 (estate and gift tax); Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 297
(minimum tax); Licari v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1991) (increase in un-
derstatement penalty); Wiggins v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 311, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1990) (mini-
mum tax); New England Baptist Hosp., 807 F.2d at 284-85 (employment tax); Temple
Univ., 796 F.2d at 134-36 (employment tax); Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928, 932 (2d
Cir. 1960) (tax imposed on gains realized by collapsible corporations); First Nat'l Bank, 420
F.2d at 731-32 (interest equalization tax); Ferman v. United States, 790 F. Supp. 656, 662-63
(E.D. La. 1992) (estate tax), aff'd, No. 92-3482, 1993 WL 185667 (5th Cir. June 18, 1993).
See generally David B. Sweet, Annotation, Retroactive Application of Federal Legislation
as Violating Due Process Clause of Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment-Supreme
Court Cases, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1105, 1115-25 (1991) (summarizing relevant Supreme Court
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v. United States,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit recently upset this trend by striking down a federal
estate tax amendment on due process grounds.12
In Carlton, the Ninth Circuit applied a novel two-factor test
in interpreting the harsh and oppressive standard. 13 First, the
court considered whether the taxpayer had prior actual or con-
structive notice of the tax change.14 Second, the court focused on
whether the taxpayer reasonably relied to his detriment on the
pre-amended tax law.' 5 The Ninth Circuit's emphasis on taxpayer
notice and foreseeability as controlling due process considerations
is perhaps the most striking aspect of its opinion.' More signifi-
cantly, the Ninth Circuit's approach to the due process problem 7
gives rise to a conflict with the circuit courts that often treat tax-
payer foreseeability as a presumption.'8
It is submitted that despite an apparent irreverence for the
majority rule, the Ninth Circuit has formulated a test that more
accurately reflects Supreme Court authority than that of any other
federal court. This Note will explore the relevant case history and
policies that support this position. Part One provides an overview
authority).
11 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992) petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3854 (U.S. June 7,
1993) (No. 92-1941).
11 Id. at 1059. But see Ferman, 790 F. Supp. at 662-63 (holding against taxpayer on
facts similar to Carlton).
1s Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
14 Id.
25 Id.
1" Id. at 1064 (Norris, J., dissenting). Judge Norris criticized the majority's finding that
the taxpayer had no constructive notice since the precedents indicated that constructive
notice is implied in situations in which the retroactive legislation merely effects a change in
the tax rate. Id. Furthermore, the court's holding created a split among the circuits. See
infra notes 65-94 and accompanying text (analyzing conflict among circuit courts).
17 Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055-59. The court first noted that the "harsh and oppressive"
standard, articulated in Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938), was controlling. Id. at
1055; see also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (explaining "harsh and oppressive"
standard). Next, the court summarized the holdings of the Supreme Court cases in which
the Court found retroactive estate and gift taxes unconstitutional. Carlton, 972 F.2d at
1056-57; see infra notes 20-33 (discussing earlier estate and gift tax cases). Finally, the court
considered the holdings and rationale of several recent Supreme Court cases. Carlton, 972
F.2d at 1058; see United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S 558 (1986) (holding retroactive estate
tax provision constitutional); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981) (holding ret-
roactive minimum tax provision constitutional).
15 Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057. The majority noted that "it cannot be gainsaid that the
modern trend has been against successful challenges to retroactive applications of the tax
statutes." Id. In dissent, Judge Norris argued that the majority, in holding the tax statute
unconstitutional, "create[d] a split among the circuits." Id. at 1064 (Norris, J., dissenting).
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of relevant Supreme Court authority. Part Two explains how cir-
cuit courts of appeals, other than the Ninth Circuit, have inter-
preted the Supreme Court cases. Part Three contrasts the Carlton
analysis with that of other circuit courts and asserts that Carlton
represents a superior interpretation of Supreme Court doctrine. Fi-
nally, Part Four argues that the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Carlton
incorporates important policy justifications which compel its adop-
tion by other federal courts.
. I. OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY
A. Estate and Gift Tax Cases
By the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court had clearly
established the constitutional validity of retroactive income tax
legislation.1" The issue again surfaced, with the enactment of a
1919 estate tax amendment, in the landmark case, Nichols v. Coo-
lidge.20 In Nichols, the Supreme Court for the first time struck
down a retroactively applied federal tax provision as violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2' Unfortunately,
the reasoning for the decision was not clearly articulated.22
The following term the Supreme Court heard two challenges
10 See Cooper v. United States, 280 U.S. 409 (1930); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240
U.S. 1 (1916); Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914); United States v. Heinszen, 206
U.S. 370 (1907); Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323 (1873). See generally
Alan S. Novick & Ralph I. Petersberger, Retroactivity in Federal Taxation, 1959 TAXES
407, 413-15 [hereinafter Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity 1] (synthesizing early Su-
preme Court cases involving retroactive income tax legislation).
20 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
21 Id. at 532. In Nichols, the decedent and her spouse organized a trust to hold real
estate for the benefit of their children. Id. at 533. The trust, which was created in 1907,
provided that its income was to go to the settlors until their death, at which time the re-
mainder would pass to their children. Id. The settlors transferred all their rights in the
trust, including the income stream, to their children in 1917. Id. In 1919, a revenue act was
passed which required that the inter vivos transfer of 1917 be included in the estate of the
decedent, who died in 1921. Id.
23 See id. at 542-43. Referring to the estate tax's retroactive application, Justice Mc-
Reynolds reasoned:
[S]o far as it requires that there shall be included in the gross estate the value of
property transferred by a decedent prior to its passage merely because the convey-
ance was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,
[it] is arbitrary, capricious and amounts to confiscation.
Id.; see also Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity I, supra note 19, at 426 (asserting that
Nichols provides little guidance for future cases).
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to the constitutionality of a newly-enacted gift tax provision.2 3 In
the first case, Blodgett v. Holden,24 a plurality of the Court held
the gift tax unconstitutional.25 The Court refused to apply the tax
to an inter vivos transfer completed during the same calendar year
but before the gift tax legislation was enacted or even considered
by Congress.2" The taxpayer's actions, the Court found, were taken
"in entire good faith and without the slightest premonition of such
consequence. 27 In the second case, Untermyer v. Anderson,28 the
Court also held application of the gift tax to a completed transfer
unconstitutional,2" adopting an analysis of taxpayer notice similar
to that of BlodgettY' Uniquely, though, the taxpayer in Untermyer
executed the gift when Congress was on the verge of approving the
gift tax provision.3 1 Despite this finding, the Court concluded that
the taxpayer could not have foreseen the gift tax,32 therefore ren-
dering its retroactive effect unconstitutional.3
3
B. Modern Trend: Toward a General Rule of Constitutionality
The Supreme Court has since retreated from these early estate
and gift tax decisions, 4 often by distinguishing them factually. 5
23 See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142
(1927), modified on other grounds, 276 U.S. 594 (1928).
24 275 U.S. at 142.
25 Id. at 147.
26 Id. at 146-47. The taxpayer in Blodgett had executed several inter vivos gifts in Jan-
uary 1924. Id. at 146. In February 1924, a tax on inter vivos gifts was proposed in Congress;
the measure subsequently passed on June 2, 1924. Id. As enacted, the gift tax applied to all
transfers effected during the calendar year 1924. Id.
27 Id. at 147. Only eight justices participated in the decision; four of the eight based
their decision on the grounds that the taxpayer lacked adequate notice. See id. The other
four justices argued that Congress had never intended the tax provision to apply to gifts
executed before the statute's enactment. Id. at 148-49. Despite the split, all eight Justices
ruled in favor of the taxpayer so the tax was struck down. See Blodgett v. Holden, 276 U.S.
594 (1928).
28 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
29 Id. at 445-46. In Untermyer, the petitioner's estate sought to recover taxes paid aris-
ing from a gift that was made prior to the retroactive enactment of a new gift tax. Id. at 444.
30 Compare Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147 with Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 444-45.
31 Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 445-46.
32 Id. The court observed that "[t]he taxpayer... ought not to be required to guess the
outcome of pending measures. The future of every bill while before Congress is necessarily
uncertain." Id.
33 Id.
I See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text. In addition to Nichols, Blodgett, and
Untermyer, the Supreme Court decided a fourth case, Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582
(1931), in which a retroactive tax statute was also held unconstitutional. Id. at 605-06. In
Long, the specific issue presented involved the same trust as in Nichols. See id. at 596.
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Indeed, only three years after Untermyer was decided, the Court
in Milliken v. United States6 refused to find that a retroactive
change to an estate tax rate was violative of due process.37 Unlike
Untermyer, the Milliken Court found that the taxpayer was ade-
quately forewarned of the change in tax rate. More recently, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Darusmont,s noted that the
authority of the earlier estate and gift tax cases was not "control-
ling" in the context of retroactive income tax legislation.40 In its
latest opinion involving retroactive taxation, United States v.
However, the Court was requested to decide whether a retroactive state inheritance tax
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 593. The Court found
the tax unconstitutional because the interests of the remaindermen were fully vested and
indefeasible prior to the enactment of the state tax. Id. at 596, 599, 605. Although Long
often is considered part of the same line of cases involving unconstitutional estate and gift
taxes, some commentators distinguish it because it concerned taxation of the beneficiary
rather than the taxation of the decedent or donor. See Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity
I, supra note 19, at 428-29.
15 See Hernme v. Unites States, 476 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1986) (distinguishing Unter-
myer); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938) (distinguishing earlier estate and gift tax
cases); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 21 (1931) (finding earlier estate and gift tax
cases not controlling); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 501 (1930) (same).
36 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
37 Id. at 24-25. In Milliken, a decedent's estate sought to recover taxes it paid on inter
vivos transfers considered to have been made by the decedent in contemplation of death. Id.
at 18-19. The estate objected primarily to the taxes attributable to the increase in tax rate
from the level applicable at the time of the actual transfers. Id. at 20. Rejecting the estate's
due process argument, the Court reasoned that the increase in tax rate merely equalized the
tax rates applicable to inter vivos transfers made in contemplation of death and transfers
taking effect at death. Id. at 23-24.
38 Id.
39 449 U.S. 292 (1981). The Court in Darusmont held that a retroactive minimum tax
amendment was constitutional because the amendment merely increased the rate and de-
creased an allowable exemption applicable to an existing minimum tax provision. Id. at 299-
300.
40 Id. at 299. Over a decade after Nichols, Blodgett, and Untermyer were decided, the
Supreme Court in Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938), held that these earlier estate
and gift tax cases were distinguishable from retroactive income tax cases. See Darusmont,
449 U.S. at 299. This distinction was premised on the assumption that a taxpayer, while
having little control over the receipt and hence the taxation of income, may forego making a
gift or bequest based on tax considerations. See Welch, 305 U.S. at 146-48. But see Bryant,
supra note 5, at 107-08 (criticizing courts that determine constitutionality of retroactive tax
laws based on "labels"-income, estate, or gift); Hochman, supra note 1, at 707 n.76 (ques-
tioning distinction made in Welch between retroactive income and estate and gift taxation).
In Darusmont, the taxpayer proposed a test that included, inter alia, an inquiry into
whether the taxpayer should have been on notice of the retroactive tax. Darusmont, 449
U.S. at 299. The Court failed to decide whether due process required inquiry into taxpayer
notice, but went on to find that, even assuming notice was relevant, the taxpayer could not
"claim surprise." Id.
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Hemme,4 1 the Court upheld the retroactive application of a transi-
tional rule implementing the unified estate and gift tax credit sys-
tem.42 Although the Court observed that Untermyr was of "lim-
ited value" in cases that did not involve "wholly new" taxes,4 3 it
nevertheless undertook a detailed analysis of the nature and cir-
cumstances of the retroactive tax.44 As evidenced by Hemme, the
Court has limited, but not overruled, the authority of the early es-
tate and gift tax cases.4 5
II. OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS' ANALYSES: IMPLIED FORESEEABILITY
In Estate of Ceppi v. Commissioner,46 the First Circuit held
that a federal tax amendment which disallowed an estate tax ex-
emption could be retroactively applied without violating due pro-
cess.47 Citing Milliken,4 s the circuit court held that the Supreme
Court had effectively limited Untermyer's authority to cases in-
1 476 U.S. 558 (1986).
42 Id. at 567-72. The taxpayer in Hemme was the trustee of the estate of Charles W.
Hirshi. Id. at 560. In 1976, Hirshi executed five inter vivos transfers to which he sought to
apply certain gift tax exemptions. Id. At the time of the transfers, Congress was planning to
restructure the gift and estate tax schemes by combining the exemptions available under
each into a single unified tax credit. Id. at 560-61. The unified credit legislation subse-
quently enacted included a retroactive transitional rule to account for amounts exempted
under the former estate and gift tax systems. Id. at 562. Hirschi's death in 1978 caused his
estate to fall within the transitional rule. Id.
43 Id. at 568.
" See id. at 567-72. The Court in Hemme acknowledged that an important considera-
tion is "whether, without notice, a statute gives a different and more oppressive legal effect
to conduct undertaken before enactment of the statute." Id. at 569. Upon comparison of the
treatment that the taxpayer would have received under the pre-amended law and the actual
treatment, the Court concluded that, in some respects, the taxpayer had actually received a
benefit under the new law. Id. at 570-71.
'5 See id. at 567-68; Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity I, supra note 19, at 430;
supra note 35 (citing Supreme Court cases that have distinguished, but not overruled estate
and gift tax cases).
46 698 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983).
'7 See id. at 22. In Ceppi, the decedent made eight gifts of stock, valued at over $6,000
per gift, to eight different relatives on January 5, 1978. Id. at 18. Ten days after the gifts
were made, the decedent passed away. Id. In preparing the estate tax return, which was filed
in October 1978, the executor claimed an exclusion of $3,000 for each gift pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 2035(b)(2). Id. Later that year, § 2035(b)(2) was amended to expressly eliminate the ex-
clusion and was retroactively applied to transactions made after January 1, 1977. Id. As a
consequence, the IRS assessed a deficiency against the estate; in response, the executor filed
a petition in Tax Court. Id. The Tax Court held for the IRS, and the executor appealed to
the First Circuit. Id.
'8 Milliken, 283 U.S. at 15; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Milliken).
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volving the enactment of wholly new taxes. 49 The Ceppi court
placed emphasis on the similarity between the retroactive change
in Milliken, which had increased the tax rate, and the disallowed
tax exemption in Ceppi.50
Relying in part on Ceppi, the Eighth Circuit in Fein v. United
States51 found the same retroactive estate tax amendment consti-
tutional.52 However, the Fein court interpreted Supreme Court au-
thority as requiring a two-pronged inquiry: (1) "whether the
change in the tax law was reasonably foreseeable;"5 3 and (2)
"whether the change was only a change in tax rate or the imposi-
tion of a new tax."54 The court further explained that the two os-
tensibly separate inquiries were actually linked "in that a change
in the tax rate is considered by its very nature to be reasonably
foreseeable. ' 55 Applying this test, the court concluded that the
"' Ceppi, 698 F.2d at 20-21. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Milliken had
distinguished Untermyer on the ground that the taxpayer in Untermyer could not have
reasonably foreseen the tax; whereas, the taxpayer in Milliken was "'left in no uncertainty
that the gift he was then making was subject to the provisions of the existing [tax] stat-
ute.'" Id. at 21 (quoting Milliken, 283 U.S. at 23). However, the court found the distinction
unconvincing, stating that "Untermyer at best remains good law only for the proposition
that a wholly new gift tax cannot be applied retroactively." Id.; accord Westwick v. Com-
missioner, 636 F.2d 291, 292 (10th Cir. 1980); Buttke v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 202, 203
(8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981); Shanahan v. United States, 447 F.2d 1082,
1083 (10th Cir. 1971).
50 Ceppi, 698 F.2d at 21. As additional support, the court cited United States v. Darus-
mont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981). Id. The Court in Darusmont observed that taxpayer notice,
even if constitutionally mandated, was satisfied because the tax amendment at issue had
been a matter of public knowledge at the time the taxable transaction occurred. Darusmont,
449 U.S. at 299. Similarly in Ceppi, the court implied that a taxpayer could be deemed on
notice of new tax legislation that was retroactively applied to the taxpayer's fully consum-
mated act when Congress had been considering the legislation prior to the taxpayer's action.
Ceppi, 698 F.2d at 22.
:1 730 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
52 Id. at 1213-14. "In coming to this conclusion, we [are] greatly aided by Judge Bailey
Brown's analysis in Ceppi ... ." Id. at 1213. In Fein, the decedent, prior to his death on
June 13, 1977, transferred a life insurance policy to his wife. Id. at 1212. At the time of the
transfer, the policy was worth less than $3,000 and therefore qualified for exclusion from his
gross estate under I.R.C. § 2035(b)(2). Id. Subsequently, the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. Law
No. 95-600, which retroactively disallowed the exclusion of life insurance policies, was en-
acted. Id. This disallowance caused the life insurance policy transferred by the decedent to
be included in his gross estate. Id.
13 Id. In support of its inquiry into foreseeability, the court cited numerous Supreme
Court cases. See id. at 1212-13; see also supra note 9 (citing Supreme Court cases that note
foreseeability is relevant to constitutional analysis of retroactive tax legislation).
Fein, 730 F.2d at 1213.
5 Id. The court relied exclusively on the authority of Milliken in making this assertion.
Id.; see Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1931).
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consequences of the retroactive tax amendment were "closer in
kind and in effect to a mere increase in the tax rate than to enact-
ment of a wholly new tax."' Since the tax change at issue was
impliedly foreseeable, and given that it could not be considered a
"new tax," the court had no choice but to uphold the retroactive
tax change.57
On facts substantially similar to Fein, the Seventh Circuit in
Estate of Ekins v. Commissioner 8 upheld the retroactive inclusion
of a life insurance policy in a decedent's gross estate.5 9 In its ra-
tionale, the court adopted the two-pronged test articulated in Fein
as well as the presumptive link between a change in tax rates and
its deemed foreseeability.60
Other circuit courts have undertaken varying approaches to
retroactive tax legislation."1 Some federal circuit courts have con-
sidered whether the taxpayer had a vested right under the pre-
existing tax statute.2 Other circuit courts have based their deci-
sions only in part on taxpayer foreseeability.65 Although Carlton
does not necessarily conflict with this latter group of cases, it is
asserted that Carlton's identifiable, multifactor test is superior to
"6 Fein, 730 F.2d at 1213.
57 Id. As in Ceppi, the Eighth Circuit also considered the authority of Untermyer to be
limited to cases involving the imposition of a wholly new tax. Id. at 1214.
58 797 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1986).
59 Id. at 485. In Ekins, the court ruled on the same estate tax provision which had been
challenged in Ceppi and Fein, I.R.C. § 2035 (b)(2). Id. at 482. The decedent similarly had
transferred certain life insurance policies to other individuals shortly, one month, before his
death. Id. As a result of the retroactive application of § 2035(b)(2), the life insurance poli-
cies, which had been excluded, were included in the decedent's gross estate. Id.
60 Id. at 484.
61 See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (describing approaches taken by other
circuit courts).
62 See, e.g., Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
that retroactive employment tax did not abrogate vested right), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014
(1987); New England Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 807 F.2d 280, 285 (1st Cir. 1986)
(same). But cf. Hochman, supra note 1, at 696 (contending that "vested rights" analysis of
retroactivity is conclusory). See generally MERTENS, supra note 6, § 4.15 (discussing vested
rights and retroactivity); Smith, supra note 3, at 409 (same).
62 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 311, 315-17 (5th Cir. 1990) (analyzing
taxpayer notice of retroactive tax change in minimum tax); Estate of Ceppi v. Commis-
sioner, 698 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir.) (noting that taxpayer had constructive notice of retroac-
tive estate tax provision), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983); see also Sidney v. Commis-
sioner, 273 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1960) (noting that taxpayer had notice of retroactive tax
amendment); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 420 F.2d 725, 729-30 (Ct. Cl.) (holding ret-
roactive interest equalization tax constitutional where taxpayer notice extensive), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Smith, supra note 3, at 418-19 (discussing retroactive legislation
and foreseeability).
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the ad hoc analyses employed by these other circuit courts of ap-
peals.64 Rather, the true conflict exists between the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Carlton and the method applied by the Seventh and
Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals.6
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS: A SUPERIOR INTERPRETATION
OF SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY
It is submitted that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have
based their construction of the "harsh and oppressive" standard on
either an overly-broad or incorrect interpretation of Supreme
Court authority. In particular, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, by
linking foreseeability and tax rate changes, have created a test that
effectively ignores the relevance of foreseeability in assessing the
constitutionality of retroactive taxation. The Ninth Circuit's
analysis, in contrast, stresses foreseeability in accordance with the
Supreme Court's consistent interest in that factor when faced with
the retroactive application of an estate or gift tax.
In analyzing retroactive tax legislation, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly examined whether the taxpayer could reasonably have
foreseen the retroactive tax. Although this consideration has
clearly not served as a bright-line test,68 the Court has placed par-
" See supra notes 62-63 (citing circuit courts that have not adopted cohesive analysis).
65 See infra notes 66-94 and accompanying text. The analyses of the First Circuit in
Ceppi, the Seventh Circuit in Ekins, and the Eighth Circuit in Fein are similar in that each
relied significantly on Milliken. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text. However, the
First Circuit test does not incorporate a presumption between a change in tax rate and its
deemed foreseeability. See Ceppi, 698 F.2d at 21-22. Since the First Circuit specifically con-
sidered taxpayer foreseeability rather than relying on a legal presumption, its decision in
Ceppi is not in significant conflict with Carlton. See id.
"8 See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (analyzing Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuits' reasoning).
87 See supra notes 20-45 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court authority);
supra note 9 (citing additional case law); see also Hochman, supra note 1, at 706. "The
primary consideration which appears from an analysis of the cases involving retroactive tax-
ation is the ability of the taxpayer, at the time of the transaction in dispute, reasonably to
have foreseen that a tax would be imposed .... " Id.
The Supreme Court in Darusmont had cast some doubt on the continued validity of
foreseeability analysis in retroactive tax cases. See Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299. The Court
refused to expressly adopt the taxpayer's formulation of the foreseeability requirement in
terms of taxpayer notice, choosing only to assume, without deciding, its relevance. Id. In
Hemme, however, the Court disregarded its earlier questioning of foreseeability, noting that
an important consideration in retroactive tax analysis is whether the taxpayer was subjected
to unfair treatment "without notice." Hemme, 476 U.S. at 569.
8 See Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299-300, in which the Supreme Court cited favorably two
earlier decisions upholding retroactive income tax provisions even though taxpayer notice
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ticular emphasis on it in the estate and gift tax areas.69 An under-
lying reason for this emphasis is the discretionary nature of be-
quests or gifts, which are usually undertaken with full knowledge
of, and reliance on, existing tax laws. 70 On the other hand, the tax-
ation of income is less subject to taxpayer control-the taxpayer
generally will not or cannot refuse the income.71 Accordingly, fore-
seeability in the context of an income tax change may be of little
72real consequence, but may be relevant when the change pertains
to estate or gift taxation. 3
In Carlton, the Ninth Circuit framed the analysis of foresee-
ability by specifically focusing on whether the taxpayer had actual
or constructive notice of the retroactive tax. 4 The court concluded
that the taxpayer had detrimentally relied on an estate tax statute
at a time when there was no meaningful notice of any proposed
change to the statute.7 The use of notice as a determining factor is
was not demonstrated. See also Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-51 (1938) (upholding
retroactive state income tax despite lack of taxpayer notice); Cooper v. United States, 280
U.S. 409, 412 (1930) (finding change in federal income tax provision constitutional).
19 See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
70 Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48.
71 See id. The Supreme Court has observed that shareholders would not refuse to ac-
cept dividend payments even if they believed that the applicable tax on dividends was going
to be increased. Id. at 148; see also Hochman, supra note 1, at 706-11 (discussing disparate
justifications for upholding retroactive income tax provisions vis-a-vis estate and gift tax
provisions).
712 See Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48.
73 See id. at 147. The Court in W6lch stated:
In the cases in which this Court has held invalid the taxation of gifts made
and completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute, decision was
rested on the ground that the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably
have been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary act
which the statute later made the taxable event.
Id.
7 See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
7 Id. at 1059-62. The petitioner in Carlton was the executor of the estate of Willametta
K. Day. Id. at 1053. Prior to filing Day's estate tax return on December 29, 1986, the peti-
tioner discovered that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (effective October 22, 1986) included an
amendment to I.R.C. § 2057 which would allow the estate to deduct half of the proceeds
received from the sale of securities to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP"). Id. at
1053-54. In order to take advantage of this provision, the petitioner arranged to purchase
1,500,000 shares of MCI stock for a total price of $11,206,000. Id. at 1054. Petitioner ac-
quired the stock and two days later resold the stock to the MCI ESOP trustee at a loss of
$631,000. Id. Petitioner, filed the Day estate return, deducting half of the proceeds received
from the sale of stock, or $5,287,500. Id. On February 26, 1987, Congress began discussions
on a bill requiring a decedent to directly own any subsequently transferred stock on the
date of death in order to take advantage of the deduction. Id. The provision was to become
effective as of October 22, 1986. Id. at 1053-54. The bill's subsequent passage caused the
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entirely consonant with the Supreme Court's rulings in Blodgett
and Untermyer.76 In both decisions, the Court found the absence
of taxpayer notice highly significant.77 Similarly, in Milliken the
Court ruled that the retroactive application of an estate tax did
not violate due process because, inter alia, the taxpayer had re-
ceived notice of the forthcoming change.78
The Court's holdings in both Darusmont and Hemme can be
distinguished from Carlton. In Darusmont, the Court found that
the taxpayer had received "ample advance notice." 79 Moreover, re-
liance was not a controlling factor because the statute provided for
an income tax.80 Factually, Hemme can be distinguished because
the challenged retroactive change was a transitional reduction of
an already existing tax credit,sl not a case in which the taxpayer
specifically and detrimentally relied on a deduction that was sub-
sequently eliminated. Further, the Court in Hemme found that the
change was not "unreasonably harsh and oppressive" because the
change, in its entirety, actually produced a tax benefit for the
taxpayer.82
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits also ostensibly considered
the impact of foreseeability in addressing retroactive taxation.83
However, upon closer examination, it appears that the foreseeabil-
ity analysis adopted by both circuit courts is conclusory.8 4 As noted
taxpayer to lose the ESOP stock deduction. Id. at 1055.
As a corollary to the taxpayer's actual reliance, the court also pointed out that such
reliance was "reasonable" because congressional intent clearly supported the prior tax provi-
sion. Id. at 1060-61. The court rejected the Government's argument that taxpayer reliance
on the statute was unreasonable because the pre-amended provision was "'too good to be
true.'" Id. at 1060.
7' See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text. Justice McReynolds, writing for the
Untermyer Court, asserted that "[tihe taxpayer may justly demand to know when and how
he becomes liable for taxes-he cannot foresee and ought not to be required to guess the
outcome of pending measures." Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928).
78 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
71 United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981).
80 Id.
I' See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
82 United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 566-71 (1986). Justice Marshall stated: "Tak-
ing into account Congress' equation, then, we cannot but deduce that appellees are no worse
off than they would have been without the enactment of the Act." Id. at 570.
11 See Ekins, 797 F.2d at 484; Fein, 730 F.2d at 1212-13.
814 Compare Fein, 730 F.2d at 1213 with Ekins, 797 F.2d at 484. Despite the Fein
court's oblique discussion of whether the taxpayer had notice of, or relied on, the pre-
amended tax law, the plain interpretation of the court's standard-the presumption that a
change in tax rate or base is by its nature foreseeable-could theoretically be applied by
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earlier, Fein and Ekins rely exclusively on Milliken for the asser-
tion that any change in a tax rate or in tax base is "by its very
nature . . . reasonably foreseeable."8 6 However, in Milliken tax-
payer notice was not presumed.88 The Court actually found the
taxpayer "well warned" of the retroactive change by the policies
underlying prior taxing statutes.8 7 Rather than address the factual
distinctions of Milliken, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits chose to
focus on certain language which, in isolation, suggests that a
change in tax rate could be presumed foreseeable.a
Arguably, under the Fein/Ekins analysis virtually any type of
retroactive change in taxation is but a change in "tax rate" and
thus should be presumed foreseeable.8 9 This type of aggressive
analysis may be justified in the context of retroactive income tax
legislation,"° which does not necessarily involve taxpayer reliance
future courts without any consideration or analysis of taxpayer notice or reliance. See Fein,
730 F.2d at 1212-13.
85 Fein, 730 F.2d at 1213; accord Ekins, 797 F.2d at 484.
66 See Milliken, 283 U.S. at 23-24. The Supreme Court in Hemme observed that the
retroactive tax change in Milliken was constitutional because the taxpayer "should have
known" of the possibility of the change. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568; see also supra note 49 and
accompanying text (interpreting Milliken).
87 Milliken, 283 U.S. at 24.
88 See Fein, 730 F.2d at 1213 (citing Milliken); Ekins, 797 F.2d at 484 (citing Fein).
The relevant portion of the Milliken opinion provides:
Not only was the decedent left in no uncertainty that the gift'he was then making
was subject to the provisions of the existing statute, but in view of its well under-
stood purpose he should be regarded as taking his chances of any increase in the
tax burden which might result from carrying out the established policy of taxation
A change in the rate applicable to transfers at death necessitates a corre-
sponding change in the rate applicable to gifts made in contemplation of
death ....
Milliken, 283 U.S. at 23-24.
89 See supra note 10 (citing examples of retroactive taxation cases). Any retroactive
change in taxation in response to which a taxpayer brings suit necessarily implies that the
taxpayer was forced to pay more taxes (e.g., because deductions were lost, new types of
income were taxed, etc.). See id. Because any of these changes in taxation will, technically,
constitute a change in the effective tax rate, the general proposition that implies foreseeabil-
ity for changes in tax rates is obviously too broad. See Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, 29
TAx LAw. 21, 22 (1975) (noting distinction between mere tax rate change and substantive
rule change).
90 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (explaining that taxpayer foreseeabil-
ity is not controlling in retroactive income tax cases); see also Ward v. United States, 695
F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing between liberal treatment traditionally ac-
corded retroactive income tax legislation as opposed to gift tax legislation). In an oft-cited
opinion, Judge Learned Hand noted the liberal treatment accorded retroactive changes in
income tax rates:
Nobody has a vested right in the rate of [income] taxation, which may be retroac-
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or expectation.9 1 However, with respect to retroactive estate and
gift taxes, the Supreme Court has indicated that taxpayer notice is
an essential consideration.92 In Carlton, the Ninth Circuit effec-
tively integrated this factor,9" whereas the Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuit Courts disregarded Supreme Court authority that requires
consideration of taxpayer foreseeability.9 -
IV. POLICY JUSTIFYING ADOPTION OF CARLTOMS ANALYSIS
Although it has long been recognized by the Supreme Court
that Congress has the discretion to enact retroactive tax legisla-
tion,93 there are limitations to this authority."6 In the late 1950's,
two commentators observed that "should some Congress of the fu-
ture be more prone to allow past, untaxed events to pay the way
for present and future government expenses, we may expect the
due process clause to again be used to tell the legislature it has
transgressed its constitutional power. 9 7 Many modern tax scholars
and practitioners believe that Congress has fulfilled this prophecy
by repeatedly enacting retroactive tax statute amendments. 8
tively changed at the will of Congress at least for periods of less than twelve
months; Congress has done so from the outset .... [O]ne may indeed complain
that, could he have foreseen the increase, he would have kept the transaction un-
liquidated, but it will not avail him; he must be prepared for such possibilities
[i.e., the retroactive increase in tax rates], the system being already in operation.
His is a different case from that of one who, when he takes action, has no reason
to suppose that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally Ballard, supra note
5, at 597-98, 602, 618-19 (noting that retroactive income tax laws have been historically
immune to constitutional attack whereas estate and gift taxes have presented more compli-
cated issues).
9 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has expressly
stated that retroactive income tax legislation should not be subject to the same considera-
tions as retroactive estate and gift taxation. See Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299 (stating that
prior decisions involving retroactive gift taxation were not "controlling authority" in area of
retroactive income tax); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1938) (same).
92 See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text (estate and gift tax cases).
93 See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussing Carlton opinion).
" See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (analyzing Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuits' opinions).
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
"e See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (stating that retroactive tax legislation is
restrained by due process).
See Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity I, supra note 19, at 432.
'8 See Frank M. Burke, Jr., The 1976 Retroactive Amendment of the Minimum Tax:
An Exercise of the Taxing Power or a Taking of Property?, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 165, 173
(1980) (criticizing retroactive minimum tax provisions); John A. Corry, Retroactive Penal-
ties Raise Constitutional Issues, 36 TAx NoTEs 723, 723-27 (1987) (asserting that retroac-
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These "technical corrections" often do not merely "fine tune" an
existing tax statute, but actually change its plain meaning.9 As a
consequence, many taxpayers have had their tax planning objec-
tives frustrated. 100
While Congressional authority to retroactively amend taxing
statutes without violating the Constitution is beyond dispute,10
Congress must also recognize its obligation to balance certain pol-
icy factors in the retroactive tax equation. 0 2 On the side of the
taxpayer, policy would dictate against retroactivity to the extent a
taxpayer has reasonably relied on an existing law. 0 3 This notion of
reliance holds special relevance to the tax area because of the "tax-
payer's paramount desire for certainty in tax planning combined
with the unique degree of specificity found in the tax laws." 0 4 A
related policy consideration is whether the taxpayer may be con-
sidered on "notice" of an impending tax change.10 5 In contrast to
tively-imposed tax penalty is unconstitutional); Jerry A. Kasner, The Amendment of Sec-
tion 2057 was Unconstitutional, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Oct. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File ("We have seen too many examples, through 'technical correc-
tions' . . . of the plain meaning of a statute being overturned."); Letter from Philip J.
Wiesner, Principal, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of
House Ways-and Means Committee (Apr. 30, 1984), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
Txnote File (arguing that "technical corrections" unfairly changed substantive meaning of
prior tax provision).
"' See Kasner, supra note 98.
100 See, e.g., New England Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 807 F.2d 280, 281 (1st Cir.
1986) (retroactive employment tax); Westwick v. Commissioner, 636 F.2d 291, 292 (10th Cir.
1980) (minimum tax provision); see also supra note 9 (citing cases in which taxpayer who
relied on statute had expectations disappointed by retroactive tax statute).
I See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984). The
Supreme Court has confirmed that, in the context of economic regulation, "the strong defer-
ence accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy is no less applicable when
that legislation is applied retroactively." Id.; see also supra note 10 (discussing extensive
power of Congress to enact retroactive tax legislation).
102 See Hochman, supra note 1, at 726-27; Alan S. Novick & Ralph I. Petersberger,
Retroactivity in Federal Taxation II, 1959 TAXES 499, 500 [hereinafter Novick & Peters-
berger, Retroactivity Il]; Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, supra note 89, at 23, 28; Rule of
Prospectivity, supra note 5, at 438-42, for general discussions of the "interest balancing"
that is required when Congress enacts retroactive tax legislation.
103 See Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity II, supra note 102, at 499-502 ("The fac-
tor of reliance is part of a general policy consideration in regard to retroactivity."); Rule of
Prospectivity, supra note 5, at 439.
104 Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 5, at 439.
105 See Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 5, at 439. Notice and reliance are intertwined
in that notice may "neutralize" the importance of taxpayer reliance. See Novick & Peter-
sberger, Retroactivity II, supra note 102, at 500. A primary concern underlying these two
policies is the taxpayer's ability to conduct his affairs with reasonable certainty and without
the "crippling effect of tax uncertainty-the inability to act at all." Retroactivity of Tax
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these essentially pro-taxpayer concerns is the government's desire
to distribute the tax burden while promoting administrative effi-
ciency. l e The interpretation and balancing of these general poli-
cies is not a simple task.10 7 However, Congress appears to have
overemphasized the interests of government at the unjustified ex-
pense of taxpayers."0 " Therefore, it is submitted that the policies
which seek to protect taxpayers' interests, such as reliance and no-
tice, should be considered by the courts as constituents of the due
process inquiry.
In Carlton, the Ninth Circuit has employed a two-pronged test
that mirrors the above-considered policy factors and reflects perti-
nent Supreme Court doctrine. 10 Although terms such as "notice"
and "reliance" may initially be imprecise, 10 the uncertainty sur-
rounding their use should diminish once courts begin to consist-
ently apply this unified framework of analysis."' Furthermore,
courts should also consider applying the Carlton test beyond the
Legislation, supra note 89, at 21; accord Hochman, supra note 1, at 692. See generally THE
FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282-83 (James Madison) (Arlington House ed., 1967) (noting that one
should be able to plan conduct with reasonable certainty of consequences).
106 See Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 5, at 441; cf. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transi-
tions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 68-70
(1977) (discussing administrative burdens of using transition rules versus grandfather
clauses in tax revision).
107 See Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, supra note 89, at 22. The difficulty of balanc-
ing the interests that underlie retroactive tax legislation is manifest. Id. The application of
these policies will often vary from one set of circumstances to another. Id.
108 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (asserting that Congress unfairly im-
plements retroactive taxation).
:1 See supra notes 13-15, 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing Carlton's analysis).
10 See Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity II, supra note 102, at 499-530, 562 (dis-
cussing thoroughly different interpretations and distinctions made in applying the policies
"reliance" and "notice"); Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, supra note 89, at 22 (noting sub-
tleties manifest in interpreting policy interest of "reliance"); Rule of Prospectivity, supra
note 5, at 439-40 ("reliance" not subject to simple interpretation). The difficulties manifest
in objectively defining the concept of notice can be seen in Purvis v. United States, 501 F.2d
311 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975), in which the majority and dissent split
on the issue of whether a presidential speech provided sufficient notice to apprise the tax-
payer of a retroactive tax. Compare id. at 314-15 (holding notice adequate) with id. at 316-
17 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (declaring tax unconstitutional).
1 See Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity II, supra note 102, at 530 (concluding that
formulation of general rules for evaluating retroactive tax legislation is possible); Retroactiv-
ity of Tax Legislation, supra note 89, at 23. Tax commentators have suggested that retroac-
tive tax legislation can be mechanically broken down into two, time-reference categories:
before the date of announced legislative change and after the date of announced legislative
change. Id. Courts would disfavor legislation affecting a6tivity in the "before announce-
ment" category, but would support application of "after announcement" rules. See id. at 23-
26.
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estate tax realm to other types of retroactive taxes.112 In sum, the
Carlton test represents a superior articulation of due process and
relevant policy considerations that should be adopted by other fed-
eral courts.
CONCLUSION
In Carlton, the Ninth Circuit took a unique approach to the
due process concerns raised by retroactive tax legislation. The
Carlton test focuses on whether the taxpayer had actual or con-
structive notice of the tax change. In contrast, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have employed an analysis that finds retroactive
tax changes presumptively foreseeable. By employing a test that
makes taxpayer notice a dispositive factor, the Ninth Circuit cre-
ated a concrete framework through which to analyze retroactive
tax laws. To this end, however, the Ninth Circuit upset the over-
whelming trend in favor of tax retroactivity.
It is suggested that the Carlton test not only represents a su-
perior reflection of Supreme Court doctrine, but also incorporates
certain policy considerations that call for overall fairness in the tax
law making process. It is hoped that when other federal courts are
asked to rule on the constitutionality of retroactive tax laws, they
will overlook historical trends and choose to focus on the Supreme
Court doctrine and policies embodied in the Carlton test. In sum,
by taking a focused approach to the due process inquiry, the Ninth
Circuit has given a clearer, more equitable meaning to an otherwise
elusive construction of the Due Process Clause.
Robert C. DeGaudenzi
11 See Bryant, supra note 5, at 107-08; Hochman, supra note 1, at 707 n.76. Tax schol-
ars have questioned the legitimacy and logic of the Supreme Court's distinction between
retroactive income tax legislation and estate and gift tax legislation. See Bryant, supra note
5, at 107-08; Hochman, supra note 1, at 707 n.76. Therefore, it may be argued that the
identical standards that apply to one type of tax could logically be applied to another.
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